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“Eventually everything connects - people, ideas, objects. The quality of the 
connections is the key to quality per se” 
 –Charles Eames 
 
 
ii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates whether venture capital firms (VCs) benefit from political 
ties (PTs), and whether VCs add value to China’s public equity market by constraining 
earnings management (EM) and improving corporate governance of their backed firms. 
The first essay examines whether PTs facilitate VCs’ successful exits via either initial 
public offerings (IPOs) or merger and acquisitions (M&As). Using a sample of 2578 
Chinese portfolio firms that received their initial VC funding during 2004-2010, this 
essay shows that PTs increases the likelihood of VCs’ successful exit through mainland 
stock markets and M&A markets. It further shows that VCs with management-level PTs 
enjoy greater success than those with ownership-level PTs, whereas no significant 
difference between central and local government PTs on VC exits. 
 
 The second essay examines whether VCs with PTs are better able to constrain 
opportunistic earnings management (EM) in Chinese IPO markets. It shows that IPOs 
backed by VCs with ownership-level PTs are more likely to conduct opportunistic IPO-
year EM, while those backed by VCs with management-level PTs are associated with 
lower IPO-year EM. The higher EM in IPOs backed by VCs with ownership-level PTs 
is mainly driven by VC lock-up sale within six months following VC lock-up expiration, 
while the lower EM in IPOs backed by VCs with management-level PTs is not 
significantly associated with VC lock-up sale. Lastly, IPOs subject to immediate exits 
from VCs with ownership-level PTs exhibit poorer post-issue stock performance, while 
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IPOs backed by VCs with management-level PTs exhibit better post-issue stock 
performance regardless of VC lock-up sale.    
 
The final essay investigates how VCs influence the size and composition of 
corporate boards. Using hand-collected data from 924 IPO prospectuses, this essay 
shows that VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards in China. Furthermore, VCs 
with management-level PTs improve governance by using their networks to recruit 
specialist independent directors with industry relevant expertise. Lastly, this essay 
shows that IPOs with more independent boards are not necessarily associated with 
better performance. However, IPOs backed by VCs with management-level PTs and 
firms that have a larger percentage of independent directors with industry relevant 
expertise exhibit higher long-term stock returns.   
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